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Abstract
In this paper I offer an interpretation of cycles in Dung-style argumentation frame-
works in which even length cycles are treated as dilemmas and odd length cycles
as paradoxes. The different properties of cycles with different parities arising from
the use of preferred semantics are argued to be coherent with this interpretation.
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1 Introduction
The importance of parity is evident from many fields: the lover pulls petals from a daisy
saying “she loves me, she loves me not” and whether the love is requited or not depends
on whether the daisy started with an odd or even number of petals. In table tennis a
rally with an odd number of shots is won by the server, while one with an even number
of shots is won by the receiver. In logic if we x-or a number of propositions together,
the result is true if and only if the number of true propositions so connected is odd.
Most importantly for our purposes, parity is important in Argumentation Frameworks
as introduced by Dung [4]1.
A very simple structure for an argumentation framework is the chain, in which
one argument (the sink) has one attacker but attacks nothing, a different argument (the
source) has no attacker, but attacks one argument, and every other argument in the chain
attacks, and is attacked by, exactly one other argument. A chain of five arguments is
shown in Figure 1. Now, starting at the source, number the arguments. Those with odd
numbers will be acceptable (in using the labelling of [7]) under grounded, preferred
and stable semantics, while the arguments with even numbers will be unacceptable
(out). If there are no cycles in an argumentation framework, things are very simple:
the grounded, preferred and stable extensions coincide: these extensions are unique
and (assuming there is at least one argument in the framework), not empty. This exten-
sion can be found using the algorithm for determining the grounded extension given
∗Corresponding author. Email: tbc@csc.liv.ac.uk. Postal address: Department of Computer Science,
Univeristy of Liverpool, Ashton Building, Ashton Street, Liverpool L69 3BX, United Kingdom.
1Any reader unfamiliar with the definitions relating to argumentation frameworks as introduced in [4],
should read that paper, or one of the many excellent summaries such as that given in [1].
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Figure 1: Argument Chain of five arguments. Odd numbered arguments are acceptable,
even numbered arguments are not.
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Figure 2: Even cycles: argument numbers have the same parity on every circuit
in e.g. [3]. Starting with the empty set, this algorithm first includes all unattacked
arguments, and then removes these arguments and those arguments they attack from
the framework. The process is repeated, including the arguments not attacked in the
new framework and removing those attacked by the newly included arguments. This
continues until no new arguments are included. Note that each step considers each ar-
gument chain in the current framework, and includes the first in the chain and excludes
the second: odd is good, even is bad; she loves me, she loves me not.
So far so straightforward. But suppose we form a cycle from a chain by adding
an attack from the sink to the source. Now if we select an argument and number
arguments from that argument we can continue indefinitely. Now suppose we consider
an argument as a sink by removing its attack. That argument will then be the sink
of an infinite set of chains, one for each time we go round the cycle before removing
the attack, each of which has the argument it originally attacked as source. If there
is an even number of arguments, we don’t have any problems: the “sink” argument
will have an even number in every chain and so will be out (see Figure 2). In an even
chain the arguments partition neatly: suppose we colour alternating arguments red and
blue: we can choose to accept the blue arguments or the red arguments. Wherever we
start our numbering we will accept all and only the red arguments or all and only the
blue arguments. Thus the grounded extension is empty (there is no source), but we
have exactly two preferred extensions, one containing the red arguments and the other
the blue. In other words we have a dilemma: we must choose which of the these two
subsets of the arguments in the framework to accept.
The situation with an odd length cycle is not so tidy. Now each time we go round
the cycle the parity of the argument will change: in a cycle of length 5, number 1
first time round will be number 6 on the second circuit, number 11 on the third circuit
and so on, alternating between odd and even numbers (see the left hand framework
of Figure 3). There is no stability here: if an argument is in for one circuit, it is out
2
1
6
11
2
7
12
3
8
13
4
9
14
5
10
15
1
2 3
4
5
6
6
7 8
9
10
11
11
12 13
14
15
16
Figure 3: Odd cycles: argument parities alternate on each circuit. This ambiguity
applies also to arguments attacked by a member of the cycle.
for the next. And whether it is in or out for an odd number of circuits, depends on
the entirely arbitrary choice of starting argument. This means that no argument in an
odd cycle can be accepted: trying to make it in on the first circuit will ensure that it
is out on the second, and trying to make it out on the first circuit will ensure that it
is in on the second. This makes it resemble a paradox, where assuming the truth of a
statement enables its negation to be derived and assuming its negation allows its truth
to be inferred. Thus the grounded and preferred extensions of an odd length cycle (of
any length) are always (only) the empty set. Nothing can be proved.
So far things seem quite in accord with intuition. For some, the problem comes
when we consider an argument attacked by an argument in an odd cycle. It might be
argued that because the attacker is never in, that argument should itself be in. But, of
course, this argument is in fact not acceptable under grounded or preferred semantics
because there is no admissible set including an argument which attacks its attacker.
That this may be exactly what we want can be seen by applying the reasoning we have
used thus far: the argument can be seen as the sink of a chain the remainder of which
is composed of the arguments in the odd length cycle (see the right hand framework of
Figure 3). Suppose there are n arguments in the cycle. Now the argument outside the
cycle will be be the n+1th argument in the chain, and so that will have a even number,
making it out. But, if we went round the cycle twice before leaving the cycle and going
to the argument outside, that argument would be numbered 2n+ 1: therefore it would
have an odd number, and so should be in. That it was out on the first circuit and in only
after two circuits is not pertinent: this depends only on the arbitrary choice of where
to start: there is no reason to consider any particular argument the source, and we can
leave the cycle to go to the external argument on any lap.
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Now consider an argument attacked by an argument attacked by an even length
cycle. Here, once we have chosen the starting argument the parity remains the same
no matter how many time we go round the cycle before going to the argument outside
the cycle. The additional argument is part of the same dilemma as the arguments in the
cycle: we can choose to accept it or reject it. In contrast the argument attacked by an
argument in an odd cycle has no stable parity and any attempt to make it in will (by an
extra lap of the cycle) give a reason for it to be out. The odd cycle poisons the whole
framework, and the preferred extension will remain empty, however many arguments
are added, as long as the cycle remains odd.
It is probably these consequences for arguments which are not themselves part
of the cycle that has led people to think there is something unsatisfactory about the
way preferred semantics treats cycles: that arguments attacked by arguments in cycles
are treated differently for odd and even cycles. This dissatisfaction has motivated the
development of semantics which do not have this property [2]2. But dilemmas and
paradoxes do arise in natural language, and so we should be able to accommodate them
in argumentation frameworks, and we should expect some peculiar things to happen if
we allow a paradox into our framework3.
It has to be conceded that while the above is in accordance with my intuitions, the
intuitions of John Pollock and the others that have had different intuitions need to be
respected. My intuitions have developed mainly from working with legal argument,
which is a very binary domain: legal questions have to be resolved for one party or
the other, and legal procedures have evolved to ensure that such decisions are possible.
Where there are arguments for both sides, some person or persons are empowered
to choose what is, and will be, the case. Those who have worked on argumentation
in different domains may have formed different intuitions, more appropriate to those
domains. Moreover, what I have presented in this section is an argument and not a
proof, and so is intended to be persuasive rather than coercive. In particular it depends
on being able to evaluate the arguments in cycles in a way similar to that used for the
arguments in a chain. This in turn requires some argument in the cycle to be chosen
as the source of the “chain”. Although the argument I have put forward is unaffected
by which argument in the chain happens to be chosen, it can still be argued that any
such choice is illegitimate, and that the arguments of a cycle should not be evaluated
in this way, and that my analogy with chains should be rejected. This is all true: my
concern, however, is only to defend traditional preferred semantics, and to argue that
it can be useful to distinguish paradoxes and dilemmas, not to deny that alternative
interpretations are possible, or that, for certain purposes, these alternatives may even
be desirable.
The next section will offer some examples of paradoxes and dilemmas to illustrate
how things should go when we have a paradox as part of our framework. Again it
2John Pollock felt a similar dissatisfaction in treating arguments attacked by cycles of different parity
differently [5]. He attempted to solve the problem with his “critical link” semantics.
3Because a paradox cannot be included in a description of a state of affairs which actually obtains, the
situation is similar to a logical theory which includes a contradiction. It may be helpful to see the empty
preferred extension of an argumentation framework with an odd cycle as akin to the so-called Paradoxes of
Material Implication, which some also find counter-intuitive, but which are an ineluctable consequence of
standard logic.
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should be borne in mind that the example is intended to support the argument that
distinguishing paradoxes and dilemmas are useful, and that traditional semantics are
adequate for this task. It is not intended to show that all other interpretations are wrong,
and that there is no role at all for non-traditional semantics.
2 Liars
Perhaps the simplest paradox is the classic Liar Paradox. Essentially the paradox is the
statement “this sentence is false”. This is clearly a paradox: the statement is true if and
only if it false. The paradox has a long history: the variant known as the Epimenides
paradox goes back to around 600 BC. Epimenides, himself a Cretan, reportedly stated
that “The Cretans are always liars.” However, Epimenides’ statement that all Cretans
are liars can be resolved as false, given that he knows of at least one other Cretan who
does not lie, at least on some occasions. The characteristic of a paradox is that if we
assume it to be true, then we can show that it is false and if we assume it to be false
we can show that it is true. Perhaps the earliest version of the liar paradox as we now
know it is attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, a Greek philosopher of the 4th century
BC. Eubulides reportedly asked, "A man says that he is lying. Is what he says true or
false?".
Here we will use a version that looks more like an argument4. Suppose that John
says “Everything I, John, say is false”. Now let P be the statement that what John
said was true; and JL1 the argument that P is true, because John asserted it (a sort
of argument from authority). JL1 is attacked by itself, since if the claim of JL1 is
true, the claim of JL1 is false. We have a simple 1-cycle, and should believe nothing.
Moreover, suppose we have another argument, JL2 attacked by JL1 such as “John
was born in Colchester because John says so”. Do we want to accept JL2 because we
can’t accept its attacker? My intuition says not: it would seem odd (to me at least)
to explain that we accept something on the basis that John said it simply because he
himself claimed that everything he says is false, and we cannot accept that. Rather,
John’s utterance should cast doubt on anything he says - JL1 undercuts any argument
which has because John said it as its premise. While in general, we are inclined to
accept what people say, and so this argumentation scheme can be useful, in the case of
John we have a good reason to doubt what he says.
Now suppose we extend the situation: John says “what Mary is saying is false (Q)”
and Mary says “what John is saying is false (P )”. Now our arguments are,
• JM1: Q because John says so; and
• JM2: P because Mary says so.
In this case JM1 and JM2 undercut one another, so that we have a two cycle.
Here we can accept either argument (using preferred semantics) but not both. We have
a classic dilemma: we can believe either John or Mary, but not both. Of course, we
4The examples in this section derive from a personal communication of Henry Prakken, reporting a
personal communication to him from John Horty. I am grateful to both.
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are not compelled to believe either, adopting grounded semantics. Note that this is also
appropriate if we consider arguments attacked by JM1 and JM2. Suppose we have
• JM3: John was born in Colchester because John says so; and
• JM4: John was born in Chelmsford because Mary says so.
JM3 is attacked by JM2 and JM4 is attacked by JM1. If we accept JM1, we
will accept JM3 (that is we accept the John statements), while if we choose JM2 we
have to accept JM4 also (that is, we believe Mary rather than John). That is, we make
a choice with respect to the dilemma represented by the two cycle, and this determines
which partition we will accept.
Let us continue the process, as a third person arrives. Now John says “what Robin
is saying is false (R)” and Mary says says “what John is saying is false (P )” and Robin
says “what Mary is saying is false (Q)”. The arguments are now:
• JMR1: R because John says so; and
• JMR2: P because Mary says so; and
• JMR3: Q because Robin says so.
and each of these arguments will undercut one of the others to form a three cycle.
Now, as with the original Liar Paradox, we have an odd cycle and so again we
cannot accept anything: if we choose to try to accept what Mary says, we must reject
what John says, which means we have no reason to reject Robin, and so we should
reject Mary. Now of course, John is reinstated and so Robin has to go, so that Mary
returns and so on ad tedium. We are back with a paradox: nothing can be shown. Again
consider an argument attacked by one of these arguments: JMR2 attacks JM3. Do
we want to believe John because we cannot believe Mary? One would think not: if we
believe John, we find ourselves with no reason to disbelieve Mary, and so no reason
not to reject JM3.5
Extending the group again will give us four people: John says that what Ann says
is false, (S), Mary again says that what John says is false (P ), George says that what
Mary says is false (Q) and Ann says that what George says is false (U ). The arguments
are now
• JMGA1: S because John says so; and
• JMGA2: P because Mary says so; and
• JMGA3: Q because George says so; and
5Suppose all three people assert the same proposition, say that Mary was born in Cheltenham (M1). Now
we have arguments JMR4 – JMR6 each of which attacks, and is attacked by, any argument concluding
that Mary was not born in Cheltenham (NMC). NMC and M1 will mutually attack. Now NMC will
be credulously acceptable because it can defend itself against the attacks JMR4 – JMR6, giving two
preferred extensions, based on the even length cycles containing NMC and M1 and NMC and JMR4
etc. One will contain NMC, and the other M1. The statements of John, Mary and Robin add nothing
to our knowledge, which is at is should be. Of course, given an even number of people NMC would be
indefensible since it would be defeated by whichever group we chose to believe, and so appear in neither of
the preferred extensions of such a framework, makingM1 sceptically acceptable.
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Figure 4: Cycle with five people
• JMGA4: U because Ann says so.
Once more each of these arguments will undercut one of the others to form a four cycle.
Now again we have a dilemma: We can choose to accept all the arguments of the men,
or all the arguments of the women. As with the two cycle, and all cycles of even length,
there are two and only two preferred extensions, and all the arguments belong to one
and only of these extensions, so that a single choice suffices to determine the status of
every argument. Again under grounded semantics the extension is empty, reflecting the
fact there is no basis or reason for choosing one set of arguments over the other.
Finally we will reintroduce Robin, who will say that what Ann says is false, while
John says that what Robin says is false, so that the arguments are:
• JMGAR1: R because John says so; and
• JMGAR2: P because Mary says so; and
• JMGAR3: Q because George says so; and
• JMGAR4: U because Ann says so; and
• JMGAR5: S because Robin says so.
This produces a five cycle (shown in Figure 4), and like all cycles of odd length, the
preferred extension is empty, and we have a paradox. If we try to choose to accept
JMGAR1, we are obliged to accept its attacker. Similarly if we try to choose its
attacker, JMGAR2, we are obliged to accept the attacker of that argument, so that
nothing can be accepted. And once more if we consider arguments attacked by ar-
guments caught in this cycle, they turn out to be no more worthy of acceptance than
the argument within the cycle that attacks the argument: We have no reason to accept
what John says regarding his place of birth simply because we cannot accept Mary’s
claim that John is stating falsehoods, because accepting what John says on this basis
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Figure 5: Attacking cycles with six people
will also oblige us to accept JMGAR2, and so believe Mary rather than John. Con-
sideration of the content leads to the realisation that JM3 and JMGAR1 must stand
and fall together because they have the same reason. But JM3 and JMGAR1 can-
not be accepted together, because accepting JMGAR1 means that we cannot defeat
the attacker of JM3. In this way we can see how the paradox spreads beyond the
propositions which compose it, and blights all the arguments with which it comes into
contact. And giving due consideration to the content is important: the relevant intu-
itions concern the concrete arguments we represent in the framework, not the abstract
structure.
Finally consider the situation shown in Figure 5. Here we have the five cycle of
Figure 4, attacking JM3 and JM4, which themselves form a two cycle since they
rebut each other. We now add a new argument based on the statement of a new person,
who is not involved with people in the cycle:
JM5 John was not born in Colchester, because Lesley says so
JM5 rebuts JM3 but is unrelated to any other argument.
Now, since we have an odd cycle, every argument except JM5 cannot be accepted
because it is attacked by an argument which has no admissible defeater. JM5 is,
however, able to defend itself. It forms a two cycle - a dilemma - with JM3, and we
can (under preferred semantics) choose it rather than JM3. Thus when it turns out
the JM3 cannot be chosen because the cycle has cast doubt on arguments based on
the assertions of John, we simply accept JM5 because we have no alternative, unless
we want to use grounded semantics instead, in which case we can reject JM5 also.
Note that if the cycle had been an even length cycle, such as the four person cycle
JMGA1−4, the situation would have been different. With an even cycle it is possible
to choose to accept the utterances of the men or the women. And here, if we choose the
men, we reinstate the horn of the dilemma which includes JM3, and so JM5 drops
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from being sceptically acceptable to being only credulously acceptable. Again some
have found this counter intuitive: why should the status of an argument depend on the
parity of a cycle to which it is not related? But in the concrete example, we again see
that this is as it should be: the argument scheme on which all our arguments is based
is undercut for people caught up in the cycle of mutual denunciation: everyone in the
case of the odd cycle; the men or the women for the even cycle. Lesley, however,
remains untainted, for the odd cycle and for both horns of the dilemma, and so we can
still always use the scheme to support acceptance of what she asserts. Whether JM5
is challenged depends on whether John can be seen as credible or not, and this does
depend on the parity of the cycle.
3 Discussion
I have argued that even cycles can be seen as representing dilemmas and odd cycles
can be seen as representing paradoxes, and that in many contexts we want to be able
to represent and distinguish paradoxes and dilemmas. Traditional preferred semantics
enable this: in the case of paradoxes we cannot believe anything, because if we try to
assume anything to be true, we can, on the basis of that assumption, show it to be false
and vice versa. Therefore the grounded and preferred extensions should be the empty
set, which is the case for Dung-style argumentation frameworks. For dilemmas we can
choose to accept either horn of the dilemma, or refuse to commit ourselves. Adopting
preferred semantics gives us two preferred extensions to choose between, and refusal
to commit is equivalent to adopting grounded semantics which gives us the empty set.
So all is as it should be.
For those who see a problem in the way arguments attacked by an argument in a
cycle are treated differently for cycles of different parities, I have offered a structural
argument in section 1, and argued on the basis of the content of the arguments in sec-
tion 2. I would further contend that many examples using real arguments will also be
seen to be correctly treated when the content is taken into account. Constructing cycles
with plausible arguments is not a simple task: much care must be taken if symmetric
attacks resulting from conflict based on rebuttal or undermining are to be avoided. It is
a pitfall of logic that once we have abstracted away the content we begin to think only
in terms of the abstract structure. But sometimes what seems intuitive with respect to
the abstraction, no longer appears intuitive when we attempt to instantiate the structure
with plausible content. The paradoxes of material implication can appear problematic
until we propose examples: on the one hand the idea that if a proposition p is false, then
P → Q is true for any Q does seem odd: but since P needs to be false to make the
implication true, and then true to draw the conclusion that Q, making use of it in prac-
tice involves believing a contradiction, drastically limiting its application in practice.
Classical logic was designed to reason with theories free from contradictions, and in
such cases the behaviour of material implication, including the associated paradoxes,
is exactly what we need. If we do wish to reason with contradictions we need special
machinery, such as paraconsistent logics, in which these problems do not arise. Recog-
nising, however, that paraconsistent (and relevance) logics may be required in some
circumstances should not lead us to abandon classical logic for those cases where it
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is appropriate. Similarly if we are confronted with a plausible concrete example that
both represents an argument (or set of related arguments) attacked by an odd cycle,
and which should intuitively, considering its content, behave differently from how it
behaves under the traditional semantics then we will need an alternative to preferred
semantics for that particular case. But even if such a candidate is found, serious consid-
eration should be given to how the arguments have been represented as it may be that
representing the arguments in a different way may mean that a new semantics is not
essential to handle the problem. The alternative semantics are often mathematically in-
teresting, but are not always necessary for representing naturally occurring arguments,
even if there are some special cases for which they are required.
An interesting general discussion of the role that should be played by intuition
in semantics of argumentation can be found in [6]. There Prakken points out that
the intuitions “of logicians are hopelessly corrupted by overexposure to formalism”,
while those of ordinary language speakers often “reveal a lack of understanding of the
reasoning patterns” involved. Even if we choose the appropriate group, we still find that
intuitions vary. An additional difficulty is that the way the problem is stated can steer
people towards one conclusion rather than another 6. If we place reliance on intuitions
we very often find ourselves developing a series of patches to meet (our) intuitions.
And when we “solve” one problem, almost certainly it will be possible to construct a
situation for which our solution is inappropriate and a further patch must be produced.
This was very much the story of calculi for non-monotonic logics in the 1990s. One
result is that our semantics may become very much more complicated as we attempt
to accommodate examples which rarely (if ever) occur in practice. Dung’s preferred
semantics offer a simple and elegant theory, which is adequate for most purposes, and
which, as I have argued in this paper, can be given an useful interpretation in some of
the apparently difficult cases.
I believe that providing a new semantics should be a last resort not a first resort.
Often we can use the insights provided by the defence of the traditional semantics to
explain in which cases new semantics are really required and when intuitions may be
misleading. I believe that in this paper I have been able to use preferred semantics
to explain why it may be both sensible and useful to treat cycles of different parities
differently in Dung-style argumentation frameworks, even when consideration of the
formalism may initially suggest that this is counter intuitive.
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